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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
DON FOSTER,
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.
ELMO J. STEED, an individual,
GORDON G. WHEELER, an individual
ELMO J. STEED and GORDON G.
WHEELER dba S & W TEXACO SERVICE,
a partnership and TEXACO, INC.,
a corporation
Defendants

No.

10685

TEXACO, INC. a corporation
Defendant and Appellant

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries resulting from
a fire at the S & W Texaco Service in Bountiful, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant Texaco filed a motion for summary judgment which was denied. Texaco's petition for intermediate
appeal to this court was granted.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Texaco seeks a reversal of the order denying its motion for summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are undisputed: At approximately
6 :30 P.M. on May 21, 1964, the plaintiff, Don Foster,
went to the S & W Texaco Service at 530 South 200
West, Bountiful, to buy gas for his truck. (Foster dep.
page 6) While Foster was at the station he was asked
by Gordon G. Wheeler, a partner in Texaco Service, and
Bob Madall, an employee of the S & W Texaco Service, to
help push a car into one of the bays of the service station.
(Foster dep. page 7) Foster was then asked to help start
the car by pouring gas in the carburetor. (Foster dep.
page 8) Foster said "It will blow up." He was assured
by Bob Madall that it wouldn't blow up. (Foster dep. page
9) Foster proceeded to pour gas into the carburetor while
Gordon G. Wheeler was blowing air in the gas tank and
Bob Madall was starting the car. (Foster dep. page 9)
While Foster was pouring gas in the carburetor, the motor
backfired setting the gas on fire. (Foster dep. page 11)
Foster jerked back and threw burning gas all over the
upper part of his body. (Foster dep. page 11) Foster
stepped back on to the edge of a can of gas spilling it
all over himself and all over the floor. This gas was also
ignited and burned the plaintiff. (Foster dep. page 11)
Foster filed suit against Elmo J. Steed, an individual, Gordon G. Wheeler, an individual, Elmo J. Steed and Gordon
G. Wheeler dba S & W Texaco Service, a partnership
and Texaco, Inc., a corporation. At the time of the acci-
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dent Texaco, Inc. had leased the service station premises
to Gordon G. Wheeler. (Simmons dep. page 5; copy of
lease agreement is found at R 51-52) There was an
Agreement Of Sale in existence between Texaco, Inc. and
Gordon G. Wheeler at the time of the accident. (copy of
Agreement Of Sale is found at R 53-54)
Mr. Simmons, Texaco Division Service Representative,
testified at his deposition that Texaco does not have any
right to hire or fire the employees that are employed by
the dealer. (Simmons dep. page 18) Texaco does not have
any control over the hours for operating or closing the
station. (Simmons dep. page 18) The expenses of operating
the station are paid by the dealer. (Simmons dep. page 18)
Steed and Wheeler were on a cash basis with Texaco so
they were required to pay for their gas and accessories
on a cash basis. (Simmons dep. page 18) Steed and Wheeler
were free to turn around and sell products that they
purchased from Texaco at any price which they felt would
be competitive with the other dealers in the area. (Simmons dep. page 18) Steed and Wheeler also bought automobile accessories from other sources than Texaco.
(Simmons dep. page 18) Steed and Wheeler were also in
a position to buy petroleum products from sources other
than Texaco. (Simmons dep. page 18) These items could
all be sold at a retail price of the dealer's choosing. (Simmons dep. page 19) There were no reports required to
be submitted by Steed and Wheeler to Texaco. (Simmons
dep. page 19) Simmons would make periodic visits to the
station to see that it was "sparkling and clean." The purpose of these visits was to assist the dealer to be competitive and to furnish him marketing helps that he could
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use to improve his business. (Simmons dep. page 19) However, Steed and Wheeler were free to do whatever they
wished in operating the business. (Simmons dep. page 19)
Steed and Wheeler could also sell their products on a
credit basis if they desired. (Simmons dep. page 20)

POINT I
STEED AND WHEELER OPERATED THE
S & W TEXACO SERVICE AS INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTORS AND WERE NOT THE
AGENTS OF TEXACO, INC.
The determinative question of whether or not a service
station operator is an independent contractor or an agent
of the producing company is one of control. If the producing company has the control or the right to control the
manner in which the operations are carried out, then the
service station operator is generally held to be the agent
of the producing company. Conversely, if the control extends only to the result to be achieved, then the station
operator is regarded as an independent contractor and the
producing company is not liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. In determining whether or not the
relationship between the oil producer and the station
operator is that of an independent contractor or masterservant relationship, the formal contract between the
parties is of substantial importance. In looking to the
contract, the way in which the station operator was compensated, the manner in which title to the business property and the product to be sold was held, and the degree
to which the oil company supervised the day to day
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conduct of the business are important. See 83 ALR 2d
1282 "Status of Gasoline and Oil Distributor or Dealer
as Agent, Employee, Independent Contractor or Independent
Dealer as Regards Responsibility for Injury to Person or
Damage to Property".
In the following cases the courts determined that the
defendant oil company had neither exercised nor retained
control over the operation of the filling station and was
not liable for the negligent acts of the filling station
operator or the operator's employees.
In Cawthon v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 124 So.
2d 517, 83 ALR 2d 1276, (Florida 1960) an action was
brought for bodily injuries and property damage resulting
from the improper repair of brakes at a service station.
The action was brought against Phillips Petroleum Co.
and the operator of a Phillips 66 Service Station. Recovery against Phillips was sought on the theory that
the station operator was its agent or on the theory of
apparent agency. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of Phillips. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed on the ground that the oil company did not have
control or right of control over the operator's methods
of conducting his business. The court pointed out that
where the oil company did not control the filling station
operator's method of operation, nor the hiring or firing of
employees, did not set the retail price for gasoline sold at
the station, nor hours of opening and closing, could not
require reports on operations from the operator and could
not force him to comply with suggestions except to the
extent that it had power to cancel the franchise, then the
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operator was an independent contractor and not an employee of the company.
In Miller v. Sinclair Oil Refining Company, 268 F.
2d 114 (5th Cir. 1959) an action was brought against Sinclair for injuries sustained when the plaintiff was severely burned in a fire. The plaintiff was standing beside
his automobile while it was being filled with gasoline when
another automobile collided with the gasoline pumps
causing the fire. The lower court directed a verdict in favor
of the defendant oil company and on appeal the decision
was affirmed. With regard to the question of control or
right of control over the service station operator, the court
said:
"The answer would appear to depend on the
facts of each case, and the main fact to be considered would be the right of control as to the mode
of doing the work contracted for. Gulf Refining Co.
v. Wilkinson, supra. In this case it is clear that the
oil company did not control the dealer's methods of
operation. It did not control the hiring or firing of
employees ; did not set the retail prices for gas sold
at the station; did not set the hours for opening
and closing the station; required no reports on
operations from Rogers ; and could not force Rogers
to comply with any of its suggestions except to the
extent that it had the power to cancel the contract
at the end of any year. Rogers' independent status
is further emphasized by the fact that he purchased
his gas from Sinclair for cash, handled automobile
tires and other merchandise other than Sinclair's,
was free to and did engage in other lines of business, supplied his own building and equipment except for the tanks and pumps, and stood to retain all
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of the profits and suffer all of the losses from the
operation of the station."
In Green v. Independent Oil Company, 201 A. 2d 207
(Penn. 1964) an action was brought for deaths resulting
from an explosion at a service station. Here an employee
of the service station was cleaning the station by spreading a mixture of kerosene, gasoline and soap on the floor.
Shortly after he started to spread the mixture a sheet of
flame swept through the service station injuring the plaintiff, a customer on the premises. The oil company was named
as a defendant on the theory that it had the right to
control the manner of performing the work at the service
station. The employee attempted to establish a masterservant relationship between the service station operator
and the oil company on the basis of the dealer's agreement, together with the fact that on frequent occasions
representatives of the oil company visited the service
station. The court pointed out that even though the oil
company's representatives visited the service station there
was no evidence that they gave any suggestions or instructions or exercised any control as to the manner of
operating the gasoline service station. The court stated
that such visits to the service station by the oil company's
representatives in no manner indicated any right of control
by the oil company and were not pertinent on the question
of the nature of the relationship. The court concluded that
the relationship between the oil company and the service
station operator was that of an independent contracteecontractor not employer-employee so the oil company was
not liable for the lessee's alleged negligence.
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In Coe v. Esau and Continental Co., 377 P. 2d 815
(Oklahoma 1963) an action was brought against a service
station operator and his lessor to recover for damage to
plaintiff's automobile for lack of adequate lubrication
occasioned by an escape of oil through a faulty oil filter
gasket installed by the operator. In support of the argument that the service station operator was the agent of
Continental, the plaintiff called the court's attention to
the following facts :
a. Continental owned the premises on which the service station was located ;
b. Continental's name was prominently displayed upon
the station premises;
c. The station was listed under the heading Conoco
Service Station in the telephone directory;
d. The operator received advice and suggestions from
Conoco concerning the standard of cleanliness at the station but he did not have to abide by them;
e. The operator paid 1%,¢ on each gallon of gas sold;
f. Although the operator controlled his business hours,
he was required to occupy the premises and operate the
station or he would lose such right.
The court held that the operator of the service station
was an independent contractor. The court stated:
"The facts and circumstances adduced by plaintiff's evidence are insufficient to raise the necessary
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inference that Continental either had the right to
control or exercised the right to control the conduct of Esau in the operation of his station. Esau
was free to, and did handle, tires and automotive
accessories of other suppliers; he procured his own
personnel, determined the daily business hours and
the methods of doing business. The petroleum products supplied by Continental were sold to Esau on a
cash basis. So far as the record discloses, Esau was
not in any way restricted in adopting his own merchandising policies."
Plaintiff contends that even if Steed and Wheeler were
independent contractors, Texaco is still liable, citing the
case of Boronskis v. The Texas Company, 183 N.E. 2d 127
(Mass. 1962). In that case the plaintiff was injured as a
result of gasoline leaking from a defective gasoline tank.
The injury was caused by a defect in the premises. The
Boronskis case has no application to the case at bar. In
the instant case the alleged hazardous condition was a
movable item of personalty. The can of gas was placed
in the bay area by one of the lessees or their employees.
Although a landlord may have a duty to make repairs to
defects in the premises that might have been disclosed
by ordinary care in making an inspection, this duty does
not extend to a movable item of personalty that may be
changed at will by the tenant.
The duty of a landlord regarding defects in the premises as distinguished from movable items of personalty was
discussed in Sincwir Refining Company v. Redding, 133
N.E. 2d 421 (Georgia 1963) where the court held that Sinclair was not liable for injuries sustained by the plaintiff
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in tripping over an advertising sign placed on the sidewalk
by the service station operators.
The court stated :
"But the placement of items of personalty, such
as a sign of the type here involved, is something
that may change frequently and at any time. It may
be in a perfectly safe position at one time of the
day and at another, even a few minutes later, in
an unsafe position. It is something that can and
may be moved at will by the tenant, his employees
or by some third party. Defects in the premises
may result from faulty construction or they may
come on gradually, perhaps getting a bit worse
from day to day as time goes on, until a dangerous
or unsafe condition obtains. The only change calculated to come about unless repairs are made is a
further deterioration. If the sign had been permanently affixed in an unsafe position or if it had
been in a defective condition the rule of Anderson
might have been applicable. But neither appears
from the evidence here."
Plaintiff has previously argued that Texaco's repainting of the charred areas shows it had control over the
lessees of the service station. Gordon Wheeler testified in
his deposition that the inside of the station was due to be
painted anyway, so Texaco went ahead with the painting
after the fire.
Q. (By Mr. Wright) Well, was it reported unofficially?

A. (By Mr. Wheeler) Well, the salesman came. I
told him what had happened and he says, "Well,
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the station is due to be painted." This is the
outside of the station is cleaned one year, the
inside one year on an alternating basis, and it
was time for the station to be painted inside.
Texaco's commitment to paint the station every year
does not show that it exercised or retained control over
the operation of the filling station.

CONCLUSION
The facts conclusively show that Texaco neither exercised nor retained control over the operation of the station.
The hazard of which the plaintiff complains, was a movable item of personalty, not a defect in the premises. Texaco
respectfully contends that it is entitled to a summary
judgment.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER
Attorneys for defendant and
appellant Texaco, Inc.

